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Governance:  
So That’s What PBL is Really All About
Research funded by the Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition 
Research Program and conducted by the University of North Texas 
Complex Logistics Systems Cluster (Randall et al., 2011) found:
PBL establishes a metric-based governance structure where 
suppliers make more profit when they invest in logistics process 
improvements, or system redesign that reduces total cost of 
ownership. (p. 324)
Governance is critical to business and economic theory. Oliver 
E. Williamson won a Nobel Prize describing firm governance. For 
Williamson and his colleague, William G. Ouchi (1981), governance is a 
way of organizing transactions. Governance is more than a contract; it is 
“a much broader concept than control. Essentially, governance includes 
elements of establishing and structuring exchange relationships as well 
as aspects of monitoring and enforcement” (Heide, 1994, p. 72). The 
essence of PBL is a governance mechanism that efficiently organizes 
complex supply chain transactions. Just as the efficiency of transaction 
“bundling” predicts the success of the firm (Coase, 1937), PBL pro-
vides a “consistent sustainment governance process institutionalizing 
a life-cycle perspective on affordable and effective product support from 
acquisition through operations and support” (Kratz & Diaz, 2012, p. 40).
Coase’s Theory of the Firm:  
Rationale for a Product Support Integrator (PSI)
Ronald Coase, Williamson’s mentor, won a Nobel Prize (The Ronald 
Coase Institute, n.d.), by asking a very elemental question: Why do firms 
exist? Using precise and brilliantly simple terms, Coase (1937) explained 
that firms provide a governance structure that, for some transactions, 
is more efficient than market transactions. The firm does this by avoid-
ing the market costs associated with knowing true price, searching for 
products and information, and enforcing contracts. Value is created 
when, “within a firm,  . . . market transactions are eliminated, and in 
place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions 
is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who directs production” 
(Coase, 1937, p. 388). For Coase, the firm is an entrepreneur efficiently 
bundling and integrating market transactions.
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The ideas embedded in the Theory of the Firm provide a foundation 
to explore the contention that multiyear PBL contracts are monopo-
lies. Long-term firm existence demonstrates that nonpure competition 
governance structures can provide value superior to frequent market 
competition. More specifically, competitive position is then based upon 
the firm’s ability to integrate complex transactions more efficiently than 
what a customer could achieve in the market alone. The firm governance 
is a form of “internal competition,” which uses profit as a source of learn-
ing (Hunt, 2000). When the PBL governance results in portions of profit 
being reinvested into innovation that drives future profit, the multiyear 
PBL creates internal competition where profit leads to learning that 
increases affordability (Randall et al., 2010; Randall et al., 2011).
The critical nuance that is often misunderstood by 
competition advocates is that profit, not competition, 
provides the signal that allows firms to learn.
The critical nuance that is often misunderstood by competition 
advocates is that profit, not competition, provides the signal that allows 
firms to learn. Integrating complex transactions then is the key to the 
efficacy of the PLB strategy profit—learning cycle. Randall and his col-
leagues (2010) found:
[that the] integrator acts as the network entrepreneur, bun-
dling knowledge and capital resources to achieve the end user’s 
requirements . . . integration links achievement of an outcome 
with network members’ actions. (p. 43)
Effective PBL strategies demonstrate that monopoly is not synony-
mous with opportunism. Good PBL governance structure can mitigate 
potential opportunism by aligning profit-based incentives (Guajardo et 
al., 2012).
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Transaction Cost Economics:  
Explaining Integrated Supply Chain 
Management and Long-Term Contracts
Coase’s student, Oliver Williamson, was also a Nobel Laureate. 
Williamson (1971, 1975) wondered why megafirms did not vertically 
integrate complete markets. In his research, Williamson identified 
behavioral dimensions, which he labeled as bounded rationality, that 
limit the quantity of transactions a firm could effectively bundle. At a 
certain point, the coordination of transactions inside the firm becomes 
so complex, decision-maker capacity is limited by bounded rationality, 
and additional transactions result in disproportionate cost (Rindfleisch 
& Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1975). Further, this bounded rationality was 
proportional to the uncertainties and complexity associated with trans-
actions (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).
Bounded rationality explains the success of an integrated supply 
chain network when the transactions are complex. Weapon systems 
sustainment strategies are tremendously complex. Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) suggests that complicated tasks require an expert 
integrator and a diverse network of supply chain partners who have the 
decision-making capacity to avoid bounded rationality for their sub-
system (Kim et al., 2010; Randall et al., 2011; Williamson, 2008). At the 
same time, bounded rationality explains how some more easily bundled 
transaction sets, such as an organic depot returning a part to specifica-
tion, can be more cost-effective.
A second element of TCE relevant to PBL is opportunism. Williamson 
(1985, p. 47) defined opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile.” 
Transactional relationships have little safeguard against opportunis-
tic behavior. The governance structure of the firm avoids opportunism 
associated with internal transactions by creating convergent goals, con-
trolling activities, and rewarding success (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). 
If the PBL strategy is considered a “firm-like unit” for the purpose of 
governance, then TCE can be used to explain how metrics and long-term 
contracts create convergent goals, control activities, and reward goal 
achievement through profit. For complex transactions, the PBL supplier 
network, working under sound governance, aligns metrics and profit to 
provide a learning process superior to frequent competition and mini-
mizes the effects of bounded rationality.
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In transactional sustainment, little incentive 
exists, and even less capital is available, to make 
life-cycle affordability investments. PBL reverses 
that trend by treating repair and redesign similar 
to make or buy.
Make or Buy Decisions: Know When to Hold ’em 
(Repair) and Know When to Fold ’em (Redesign)
A defining element of a complex system is one where the postproduc-
tion spend significantly exceeds the production spend. Unfortunately, 
that postproduction spending at best simply maintains the status quo. In 
transactional sustainment, little incentive exists, and even less capital 
is available, to make life-cycle affordability investments. PBL reverses 
that trend by treating repair and redesign similar to make or buy.
Simply put, make or buy predicts, when all transactions costs are 
considered, if firms should make or buy an item (Coase, 1937; Walker 
& Weber, 1984; Williamson, 1985, 2008). The make-or-buy decision 
seeks “the most efficient mode of governing the transaction” (Walker 
& Weber, 1984, p. 373). The idea underlying the choice of make or buy is 
similar to the spare-or-repair decisions predicted by the PBL governance 
structure. The goal in make (repair) or buy (redesign) is to seek the most 
cost-efficient approach to satisfy demand for some item.
PBL and non-PBL managers focus on gaining efficiency and effective-
ness regarding inventory management, repair, and overhaul. Yet, for the 
PBL manager the money spent purchasing spares, repairs, and overhaul 
is continuously calculated against an investment in new materials, 
processes, and technologies that will improve reliability and correspond-
ingly drive out demand for that particular spare part (and its warehouse, 
inventory, and transportation cost), along with repair or overhaul tasks 
(Randall et al., 2011).
When a supplier has a new process that reduces the cost to redesign 
(buy) a part, then the PBL strategy dictates a shift from repair to rede-
sign. Figure 1 graphically depicts using the idea of make or buy for repair 
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or redesign. The vertical axis denotes the financial case for repair or 
redesign. The horizontal axis represents different parts. The parts that 
appear on the left and right side have a clear financial case. The ability of 
the PBL governance to use innovation and investment to move the parts 
near the middle from repair to redesign is the essence of life-cycle afford-
ability. In transactional postproduction support, there is no governance 
mechanism to shift the repair-redesign frontier.
The long-term contracts create pools of monetized cost avoidance 
that represent potential profit when the repair-redesign frontier is 
moved to the right. The profit pools provide the suppliers an incentive 
to invest in new material, process, and capabilities that will push items 
across the repair-redesign efficient frontier. Thus the learning—invest-
ment—profit cycle of PBL overcomes the potential opportunism of 
limited external competition.
The idea that new materials, processes, and technologies will move 
parts across the redesign frontier is fairly intuitive. The economic case 
for shifting from repair to redesign is less intuitive. The costs associated 
with redesign can be daunting; they include the engineering hours of the 
design itself, production of parts, changes to the configuration baseline 
and technical orders, new test equipment, and new spares. However, the 
cost associated with continuous repair is very real. Ultimately, life-cycle 
FIGURE. GRAPHIC DEPICTION OF THE IDEA OF MAKE OR BUY 
FOR REPAIR OR REDESIGN
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cost reduction requires managers to recognize a compelling case for the 
recovery of nonrecurring costs linked to redesign. The math associated 
with redesign is fairly surprising.
Table 1 provides a redesign economic model. This example illumi-
nates the impact that contract length has on the repair-redesign decision. 
Targeting demand reduction on a few key parts can have significant 
impact on affordability. This example assumes constant year dollars, 
and no weighted average cost of capital discount. Given that a $7 mil-
lion component redesign doubles the mean time between failure, and 
that doubling reduces demand for that component by 50 percent (200 to 
100 demands per year), a rational actor, given a 3-year contract, will not 
invest the $7 million in nonrecurring redesign costs. However, extending 
the contract by 1 year, we find that a rational actor will make the rede-
sign investment. Universally, when a component switches from repair 
to redesign, both the near-term (on-equipment maintenance) costs and 
long-term (total life-cycle) costs go down for the customer. Once the 
nonrecurring costs are recouped, the cost avoidance piles up for the 
remaining life of the system—increasing affordability.
TABLE 1. IMPLICATION OF CONTRACT LENGTH ON REPAIR 
VERSUS REDESIGN EFFICIENT FRONTIER
Repair Redesign
Demand 200 100
Cost per repair $20,000 $20,000
Nonrecurring $0 $7,000,000
Total cost year 1 $4,000,000 $2,000,000
Cumulative cost $4,000,000 $9,000,000
Total cost year 2 $4,000,000 $2,000,000
Cumulative cost $8,000,000 $11,000,000
Total cost year 3 $4,000,000 $2,000,000
Cumulative cost $12,000,000 $13,000,000
Total cost year 4 $4,000,000 $2,000,000
Cumulative cost $16,000,000 $15,000,000
Total cost year 5 $4,000,000 $2,000,000
Cumulative cost $20,000,000 $17,000,000
Cost Savings Redesign  $3,000,000
Note. For simplicity, analysis does not consider discounted net present value.
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In PBL, contract length directly impacts the repair-
redesign efficient frontier and has tremendous 
implications for life-cycle affordability.
In PBL, contract length directly impacts the repair-redesign efficient 
frontier and has tremendous implications for life-cycle affordability. The 
length of a specific PBL contract depends on the potential to drive out 
cost by redesign, recovering nonrecurring costs, and the costs associated 
with repair. This raises the question, is there an end point where no more 
cost can be avoided? In theory, yes; in practice, no. The key determinants 
for success will be the availability of new processes, materials, and 
technologies, and the ability to monetize out-year spending. As long as 
innovation and supply chain collaboration results in a shift from repair 
to redesign, and as long as defense postproduction spending accounts 
for billions of dollars, PBL-type strategies will continue to produce effi-
ciency and effectiveness improvements.
Core Competency:  
Exactly Who Should Do What and Why?
Significant PBL discussion is still ongoing about who should do 
what and why. A 1990 Harvard Business Review article by Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990) provides a theory-based way to answer that question. They 
discuss the idea of core competency as a framework to integrate orga-
nizations that have the complementary “core competencies” needed to 
achieve success. Core competencies are “the most powerful way to pre-
vail in global competition” (Prahalad & Hamel, p. 79). Core competencies 
are central to business success. By definition, the core competencies of a 
firm are difficult to imitate, versatile in the marketplace(s), and protect 
against commoditization by being recognizable as significant value to 
the end customer (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Recognizing what core 
competencies are and are not allows business strategists to figure out 
when to partner, and who should do what.
The idea of core competency should drive the teaming strategy of 
the PBL governance structure. For example, generally, the entity that 
designed and produced the part will have the highest redesign core com-
petency. When a third party offers a lower cost solution, this is likely to 
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be the result of some externality (e.g., the third party wanting into the 
market, the third party developing some type of Schumpeterian innova-
tion, the original equipment manufacturer [OEM] losing competency, or 
an inefficient OEM cost structure). The competency logic also applies to 
purchasing, inventory management, warehousing, and transportation. 
Core competency explains why highly successful third-party logistics 
providers, like Menlo Logistics, are valued DoD partners. When it comes 
to repair and overhaul, the DoD depots have established core competen-
cies that often make them the smart partner of choice. Few would argue 
the ability of Tinker and Jacksonville to overhaul engines, or Ogden to 
rebuild landing gear. Core competency provides a theory-based frame-
work for decision makers to predict who should be doing what and why.
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It makes sense that suppliers would bear the risk 
for performing typical logistics functions, while 
also making the repair-redesign decision. Yet, risk 
management is about balancing risk and reward.
It’s About Risk
Risk allocation and, more specifically, placing risk where it is han-
dled most cost-effectively is elemental to PBL (Randall et al., 2011):
PBL represents a governance structure that drives responsibility for 
supply chain transactions to those entities most capable of completing 
those transactions at the least cost and lowest risk. (p. 343)
It makes sense that suppliers would bear the risk for performing typi-
cal logistics functions, while also making the repair-redesign decision. 
Yet, risk management is about balancing risk and reward. Not uncom-
monly, PBL contracts may specify some type of gain sharing when profits 
exceed a certain level, subject to investments having been recovered. At 
the same time, it may be appropriate that customers share in costs asso-
ciated with unforeseeable circumstances. Both ends of the risk-reward 
spectrum can be addressed by the governance structure.
Supply Chain Management: On the Rise
In a landmark 2001 Supply Chain Management Review article, Rice 
and Hoppe (2001) argued that competition is no longer firm against firm, 
but supply chain versus supply chain. Improved connectivity, increased 
efficiency, higher quality, and standardized processes have reduced sup-
ply chain transaction costs (Kaipia, 2009). Supply chain management 
efficiently brings together firms with complementary core competencies.
How sig nif ica nt is the rise in supply cha in ma nagement? 
Manufacturers spend 40 to 70 percent of the cost of goods on purchased 
goods and services (Trent, 2007). The efficiency of supply chain gov-
ernance structures and the ability to integrate complementary core 
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competency have resulted in transactions moving from the firm to the 
supply chain. Even Walmart goes to the supply chain for logistics support—
Exel Logistics manages Walmart’s Canadian logistics operations. Bose has 
heavily integrated suppliers into its research, design, and manufacturing.
Effective supply chain management can deliver products and ser-
vices that create customer value at the least total cost. Supply chain 
management value (outcome divided by cost) is based upon the ability 
of the integrated supply chain to exceed the value of internally managed 
transactions (Lambert & Garcia-Dastugue, 2006; Walker & Weber, 1984, 
1987). The rise of efficient supply chain governance structures is not 
coincidental to the rise of PBL success.
Providing value is inherently a return on 
investment strategy and requires a long-term 
relationship between customers and suppliers.
Service-Dominant Logic: A New Exchange 
Framework—And It Looks a Lot Like PBL
Scholars Stephen Vargo and Bob Lusch (2004) recently developed 
a new framework for market exchange called Service-Dominant Logic 
(SDL). SDL suggests that economic expansion and competitive position 
can be predicted based upon the supplier networks’ ability to leverage 
knowledge to create evolving customer value. Similar to PBL, SDL 
creates value not by delivering products, but by using knowledge to 
create performance.
In SDL, the product is not in and of itself valuable—the product is 
a distribution mechanism for value (Lusch, 2011). This value focus is 
similar to PBL. In PBL, the metric provides a value-based feedback 
mechanism. Specifying delivery of performance, not products, leaves the 
suppliers free to invest in innovation, create cost avoidance, and harvest 
profits. This dynamic creates learning, rewards investment, and spurs 
new investment. Similarly, in SDL the primary flow is knowledge, and 
integration is the highest core competency.
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The idea of PBL as an application of SDL has received consider-
able attention in academic circles. A 2011 PBL-focused article in the 
International Journal of Logistics Management won the emerald literati 
commendable paper award (Randall et al., 2011). That article states 
that SDL:
. . . provides an effective mechanism to show how certain PBL 
ecosystems, their suppliers, customers, and integrator, can 
efficiently adapt to environmental changes, and thus predict 
competitive advantage of that network. The key to that com-
petitive advantage is the f low of knowledge-based resources 
between the supplier network partners as focused on satisfying 
a customer service requirement. (p. 332)
Providing value is inherently a return on investment strategy and 
requires a long-term relationship between customers and suppliers. 
The knowledge orientation of SDL and its focus on creation of value, not 
simply supplying product, provides an economic foundation to predict 
the success of a PBL governance structure that aligns metrics, incentive, 
knowledge management, integration, capital, supply chain relationships, 
and learning to create affordability.
Research should seek to develop design solutions, 
coupled with efficacious PBL governance structure, 
thereby enabling cost-effective innovation across a 
program’s life.
A Framework for PBL Governance Decisions
PBL rests on a fabric of sound business and economic theory. PBL 
governance structures minimize the costs associated with filling 
demand for parts, while continuously reevaluating how new material, 
processes, and technologies  can improve reliability and repair efficiency, 
reduce demand for parts, and decrease life-cycle cost.
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This implies a powerful, yet fairly simple PBL-based Life Cycle 
Affordability framework (Table 2). Given a proper PBL governance 
structure, affordability can be achieved by reducing the supply chain 
cost associated with meeting demand for parts (X-axis) or reducing the 
demand for parts and cost of repair (Y-axis). Program characteristics 
(e.g., parts demand) can be used to determine differing potential, con-
tract structure, and partnerships—governance.
Quite simply, how quickly and cost-effectively new materials, pro-
cesses, and technologies are infused into a PBL program is the essence of 
affordability. Research should seek to develop design solutions, coupled 
with efficacious PBL governance structure, thereby enabling cost-effec-
tive innovation across a program’s life.
TABLE 2. LIFE-CYCLE AFFORDABILITY FRAMEWORK
Cost avoidance potential — Medium
• Demand for parts is low
• Demand for repairs is low
• Redesign potential is high
Potential opportunities:
• Reliability, repair, and diagnostic
Cost avoidance potential — High
• Demand for parts is high
• Demand for repairs is high
• Redesign potential is high
Potential opportunities:
• Supply Chain, reliability, repair, and 
diagnostic
Cost avoidance potential — Low
• Demand for parts is low
• Demand for repairs is low
• Low, or risky redesign potential
Potential opportunities:
• Limited
Cost avoidance potential — Medium
• Demand for parts is high
• Demand for repairs is high
• Low, or risky redesign potential
Potential opportunities:
• Supply chain
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Summary
This article uses business and economic theory to weave a theo-
retical framework that gives leaders the ability to explain, predict, 
refine, and advocate for effective PBL strategy. The theory of the firm 
provides a mechanism to the role of an integrator to act as the network 
entrepreneur who reduces transaction cost and efficiently links actions 
with outcomes. TCE affirms the role of integration, while describing in 
theoretical terms how PBL governance addresses bounded rationality 
and opportunism. Bounded rationality and the idea of core competency 
explain why PBL strategies benefit from the network of firms collaborat-
ing to increase affordability. Understanding opportunism gives insight 
into how monetizing cost avoidance ameliorates the negative aspects of 
a monopoly partnership. Ultimately, profit leads to learning, and learn-
ing leads to smart investment—thus profit, learning, and investment 
cannot be. DoD can continue to spend on spares, repairs, and overhaul, 
or it can create partnerships that leverage new materials, processes, 
and technologies and supplier investment to improve affordability. 
TCE shows how the PBL governance structure manufactures internal 
competition that is more efficient than frequent market competition for 
complex transactions. Make or buy explains how shifting from repair to 
redesign is the essence of affordability, and the role of contract length 
in that decision process.
Supply chain management is shown to provide the complementary 
core competencies needed to create affordable complex systems. PBL 
also uses the idea of competency to drive risk to the point where it is 
managed most cost-effectively. PBL is shown to be a practical imple-
mentation of the SDL exchange paradigm. This means the massive 
expansion of high-quality, peer-reviewed research into SDL research 
provides a readymade foundation to further the efficacy of PBL. In PBL 
and SDL, what matters most to customers is performance (service), not 
parts (products).
Conclusions
The Proof Point Project (Boyce & Banghart, 2012) provided empirical 
evidence of PBL success. This article augments that effort by providing 
the business and economic theory at the core of that success. The critical-
ity of reducing a weapon system’s life cycle demands that senior leaders 
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inculcate into the acquisition corps a respect for business theory—simi-
lar to the strong respect that the corps has for engineering theory. It is 
critical that decision makers continue the intellectual engagement aimed 
at understanding the theoretical and practical foundation for successful 
PBL governance structures.
Can we do better? Certainly. But let’s not forget what we have done. 
DoD has provided the most capable and reliable warfighting systems ever 
known. I have personal experience with a number of these systems, and I 
am awestruck by their capabilities and the competencies of the men and 
women who created them. At the essence of PBL, we encounter familiar 
concepts. We know how to team. We know how to invest. We know how 
to blend core competencies—sea, land, air, and space. We know how to 
innovate. PBL simply provides a rational governance structure that 
blends new ideas with old ideas to create more affordable systems. The 
Life Cycle Affordability Framework for PBL is encapsulated in Table 2. 
What is left is a few guiding thoughts on how managers might implement 
these insights via the framework. Table 2 provides those thoughts.
In capitalism, the metric for success is profit = revenue – expense. 
In DoD, the metric for success will be quantified as capability (assets x 
readiness) where capability = budget – cost. An effective entrepreneurial 
program leader will increase capability (i.e., lethality, maintainability, 
and/or reliability) by leveraging innovation and governance to lower 
cost. To that end, grooming leaders and program integrators who func-
tion as business-savvy entrepreneurs is essential to the success of the 
nation’s warfighters.
Business theory allows one last prediction. Leaders have a choice. 
Those leaders who choose not to develop a theoretical understanding 
of life-cycle affordability may unwittingly begin to resemble mercurial 
alchemists, with a frustratingly inconsistent ability to reduce weapon 
system life-cycle cost or explain the efficacy of affordability-oriented 
strategies like PBL. Leaders who do not understand theory will be forced 
to watch as their peers explain, predict, refine, and advocate for PBL 
success after success. Leaders armed with theory will understand how 
to employ PBL strategy to build collaborative supply chain governance 
structures that increase the affordability of national security.
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